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Design for Improving Hospital Stroke Unit Processes:  
Reducing Complex Systems Failures Leading to Adverse Patient 
Outcomes 
 
Dr. Terence Love, Curtin University of Technology and Edith Cowan University, 
Australia; Lancaster University, UK; and IADE/UNIDCOM, Portugal. 
Dr. Trudi Cooper, Edith Cowan University, Australia. 
Abstract 
This paper describes recent research involving a user-focused design analysis 
of in-hospital residential treatment for stroke patients.  
The focus of the research was to identify positive and negative design 
heuristics associated with addressing poor performance, errors and failures of 
patient care associated with current designs of hospital systems processes 
being inadequate to address actual levels of system complexity.  
The research findings are based on an in–depth case study following a single 
patient through a stroke unit in a medium scale hospital of (approximately 280 
acute beds overall) with 26 stroke unit beds. The case study involved over 200 
hours of observations over nine weeks and liaison with hospital and family over 
the four months of the patient’s stay in hospital. 
The findings suggest an explanation for the lack of effective advantage so far 
shown for integrated care as compared to conventional multidisciplinary care. 
In essence, they suggest that integrated stroke care and multidisciplinary care 
are both  subject to similar serious systemic organisational failures that in effect 
reduce outcomes of both to a similar compromised position. 
The paper concludes with three design heuristics for improving stroke unit 
outcomes via improving the design of stroke unit organisational systems. These 
proposed heuristics may be of benefit more widely in hospital system design 
for improved outcomes. 
Keywords 
Hospital System Design, Design Strategies, User-Based Assessment, Case Study, 
Viable System Model. 
 
In-hospital residential stroke support services are increasingly important 
because stroke are one of the major causes of disability and premature death 
in the developed world (NCHS, 2007; van der Walt et al., 2005). In-hospital 
stroke units are regarded as the gold standard in stroke care (Royal College of 
Physicians, 2002; van der Walt et al., 2005).Typically, in-hospital residential 
stroke service units bridge between initial crisis care for stroke victims and their 
return to the community; whether at home, in care or in a residential nursing 
facility (Royal College of Physicians, 2002). 
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Stroke units are complex socio-technical systems and they reflect the systemic 
complexity of the hospitals of which they are a part. Hospitals are both 
systemically complex and renowned for systemic errors leading to 
unacceptably high levels of hospital induced mortality and adverse 
consequences and poor treatment as reported by the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) in the US (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). In the US at the turn of 
the millennium, deaths due to hospital errors exceeded motor vehicle 
accidents, breast cancer and AIDS to the extent that the IOM report 
suggested that hospitals comprised a ‘non-system’. In essence, hospitals are 
dynamically changing socio-technical organisations, with non-systemic 
organisational structures and thus systems design is compromised and difficult. 
Regardless of these unacknowledged systemic foundational issues, hospitals 
are presumed designed as systems, e.g. in the UK, hospitals are part of what is 
collectively known as ‘the Health System’ or the ‘Hospital System’.  
The perspective taken in this systems-focused case study is organisational 
rather than clinical or medical treatment. The research used a “deep slice” 
approach and followed a single patient and their pathway through the 
hospital system from stroke at home to nursing home care. The research 
identified system design issues that offered opportunity for improvement in 
hospital services to the patient between the time of emergency admission 
and the time of discharge nearly four months later. Many of the identified 
design issues were associated with real or potential system failures or poor 
system performance that could be improved via design. Data collection was 
by informal observation of over 200 hours (over 3-5 hours of observer 
involvement six days a week for nine weeks) plus liaison with hospital and 
family members over the whole of the four months of the patient’s stay in 
hospital. Data analysis has focused primarily on the combined use of critical 
analysis and systems analysis tools of Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) and 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (LoRV) with the extensions of Love and 
Cooper (see, for example, Beer, 1989, 1995; Glanville, 1994; Heylighen & Joslyn, 
2001; T Love & T Cooper, 2007; Stockinger, n.d.). Identifying features of 
descriptions have been changed to avoid identifying the patient, the hospital 
or the healthcare provider.  
Background 
Stroke units are complex socio-technical systems that act as a single point of 
contact to combine and co-ordinate all the necessary services to support the 
acute treatment and rehabilitation of stroke patients (Stroke Unit Trialists' 
Collaboration, 2007(1995)) and have a recommended structure comprising 
(van der Walt et al., 2005): 
• geographically defined unit 
• the presence of a coordinated multidisciplinary team (stroke physician, 
nursing staff, occupational therapist, physiotherapist, speech 
pathologist, dietician, social worker and, where possible, psychologist) 
• access to ongoing professional education 
• regular team meetings for care and discharge planning 
• use of agreed evidence-based management protocols 
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From a systemic perspective, stroke units fit within Individual hospitals that 
comprise a mix of sub-system organisations, services groups, each with 
differing systems and professional/work cultures. A key issue is sub-system 
integration and this can be of life and death importance as Kohn and 
colleagues identified (Kohn et al., 1999). An example is the integration of 
patient feeding with medical treatment in which correct feeding (including no 
feeding) must be matched to other clinical treatment activities such as 
surgery, diabetes treatment and stroke recovery. 
Their complex high level of interdependencies with the other hospital systems 
makes stroke units potentially an ideal study for understanding and improving 
design of organisational systems hospital systems in general. This is particularly 
so as research reported by the Royal College of Physicians(2002) in Scotland 
has identified that stroke units sit on a boundary in which it is unclear whether, 
organizationally, integrated care or ‘usual’ hospital care offers the best 
advantages, and thus stroke units may act as a potential boundary indicator 
in terms of hospital organisational structures. Typically they are loosely 
integrated multi-service units that include: basic patient care (feeding, 
toileting, washing, personal support etc); medical treatment to address acute 
issues associated with the stroke (cerebral clots and hemorrhages as well as 
incidental damage from e.g. falls resulting from the stoke); physical 
rehabilitation services (mostly physiotherapy and speech therapy); and 
hospital to community re-integration services aimed at facilitating the earliest 
transfer of patients from (expensive) hospital care to (cheaper) community 
alternatives. Thus In-hospital residential stroke service units offer a useful focus 
for understanding and improving design of hospital systems more widely.  
Stroke units are complex in five dimensions: 
• Managerially complex: due dynamically shifting parallel and 
multifaceted webs of treatment responsibility, authority paths, patient 
‘ownership’, payment and budgeting. 
• Clinically complex: due to the wide variety of presentations of patients 
and their needs for treatment, rehabilitation and parallel management 
of pre-existing conditions, particularly as the relatively long 
hospitalization can result in secondary illness such as DVT, pressure 
sores, accidental injury because of falls, and depression as a 
secondary outcome of disability caused by the stroke. 
• Administratively complex: because each of the above managerial 
and clinical aspects are associated with their own individual paper 
and electronic administration systems that overlap and integrate 
differently into overall National Health Service systems, as defined 
locally by Health Trusts. 
• Informatically complex: as they act as a node receiving and 
disseminating patient and treatment information in the multiple 
dimensions of patient care and treatment that they address, including 
rehabilitation into community care. 
• Technologically complex: relatively unusually for a hospital, the 
technological complexity of stroke units is primarily to do with low tech 
but large number of technologically based services and interactions. 
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This contrasts for example, with the high tech found for example in 
surgery. 
This complexity is in part due to the ‘4H’ nature of the hospital environments in 
which stroke units are located – high risk, high technology, high cost and high 
required skill. In parallel, these are essentially user-centred environments in 
which the focus is on best serving the patients (the users of the health system) 
in terms of their recovery to health. The primary intent of hospital systems is to 
address patients’ needs efficiently and effectively and avoid mistakes that are 
life-threatening, adversely affect clinical treatment outcomes, delay or 
reverse patient recovery, or compromise the potential for the patient to 
reintegrate into life outside hospital. Hospital treatment is a high cost 
environment compared to community care and thus must be used only 
where necessary. A significant aim in terms of stroke unit system effectiveness, 
therefore, is to facilitate the return of patients to return home or into 
community care as soon as possible to reduce costs.  
Design of stroke unit (and hospital) systems must necessarily address two 
phases of patient treatment: an initial acute phase and then a stabilised 
treatment phase. Emergency admissions operate reactively within an 
environment of high variability and unpredictability to provide acute 
treatments. In organisational terms, this creates specific planning problems in 
dealing with acute situations with relatively low information determinacy, i.e. 
the full details of a person’s illness are often not available. After the initial crisis 
response, however, organisational systems should proactively facilitate a 
patient’s progress through the system and the patient’s eventual discharge 
into community-based care.  
The case study below reviews the organisational systemic issues relating to a 
single case of a patient admitted as an emergency to a hospital with 
symptoms of collapse and unconsciousness. The treatment pathway was that 
of stroke assessment and rehabilitation. The central component of the study is 
of the systems of the in-hospital stroke unit. The study below: 
1. Describes a real life case 
2. Identifies potential for systems design improvements 
3. Identifies potential for improved design strategies 
The benefits of undertaking a case study following a single patient through the 
system, rather than (say) using aggregate data across many patients, are that 
it reveals specific systems failures and links them to their antecedents; it offers 
the opportunity to ask in the moment, ‘how could this system be designed 
better?; and it reveals and identifies in a concrete way specific design 
opportunities that follow from particular real world events that are part and 
parcel of being a hospital user. 
Case Study – Elderly Man Treated for Stroke via In-Hospital 
Stroke Unit 
Michael was an elderly man admitted to hospital following a major stroke. 
Admission was by ambulance directly to the Accident and Emergency 
Department. He arrived mid-morning. Following triage he was transferred to 
the Medical Assessment Unit (MAU) to await placement. He remained there 
for two nights. It is unclear whether standard recordings were kept, but these 
Undisciplined! Proceedings of the Design Research Society Conference 2008.  Sheffield, UK. July 
2008 
 
459/5 
could not be found some weeks later when they were requested (design 
issue).  
The MAU acted as a holding bay for patients awaiting test results that 
determine treatment and identify the appropriate specialist ward (design 
issue). Tests confirmed a major stroke. Michael was aphasic, unable to swallow 
and suffered hemi-paralysis.  
The stroke unit had no spare beds. Michael was placed in a male medical 
ward (design issue). Because Michael was immobile, his relatives inquired 
about what nursing precautions were being taken to prevent bed-sores. They 
were told that no pressure relieving mattresses were available and nursing 
care would ensure he did not develop bed sores (design issue). The medical 
ward was geared to the needs of patients recovering from surgery, but 
actually included patients with a variety of needs, placed there because 
beds were not available in wards more appropriate to their needs (design 
issue). Staff did not have good understanding of the needs of non-surgical 
patients, e.g. all patients were dressed in hospital gowns rather than pyjamas, 
as a matter of course (design issue). Aphasic patients were assumed unable 
to understand and staff did not talk to Michael, reassure him, explain 
procedures or seek his consent (design issue).  
Patients’ names were written on a whiteboard. To avoid medication confusion, 
an asterisk was placed by the names of patients who shared the same family 
name. The researchers noticed that two pairs of patients shared the same 
family name, but only three patients had asterisks by their names. One of the 
four patients had been missed (design issue).  
Before Michael left the surgical ward, he developed a sore on the heel of his 
immobile leg. A pressure relieving mattress was eventually located after his 
relatives drew attention to his need (design issue). The sore was not fully 
healed when he was discharged from hospital over three months later (design 
issue).  
After a stay of three nights a bed became available in the Stroke Unit and 
Michael was placed in a single bedded ward in the acute section. He 
remained there for just over two weeks. The wards had a hand basin to 
enable staff to wash their hands as an infection control measure. Infection 
control in UK hospitals is a high priority and of particular concern in this specific 
hospital with high public awareness posters and education schemes to 
promote hand-washing by staff and visitors. The sink waste became blocked 
and staff and visitors were unable to wash their hands. Although staff reported 
this to the maintenance department it had not been repaired a week later 
when Michael was transferred to the rehabilitation ward. The reason given for 
the delay was that the repair was classified as non-urgent (design issue).  
Michael was assessed and found to have a weak swallow reflex (and hence 
might choke on food) but could be tried on ‘tasters’ of thickened fluids and 
pureed food in small amounts. The weakness of his swallowing reflex meant 
that he could only be fed by trained nursing staff. He slept a lot, a side effect 
of a stroke, but feeding could only occur when he was not drowsy. His meals 
would arrive and a trained staff member would sometimes look in to see 
whether he was awake. If he was not awake or if no trained staff member 
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checked, his meal was removed, even though a few minutes later he might 
wake up and be able to be fed (design issue).  
At this stage, Michael had not eaten for over a week, during which time he 
had received two gastro-nasal feeds and visibly lost weight. Initially, Michael 
had very little appetite but later his appetite returned. On many occasions 
when Michael was awake and food was served, no trained member of staff 
was available to feed him and he had no food. Four weeks after his stroke, he 
had lost 15kg and looked emaciated (design issue). 
Three weeks after Michael’s stroke, he was started on physiotherapy on a daily 
basis. At this time, he was still rarely getting sufficient food and he appeared 
tired and weak and confused. The physiotherapists decided that he was not 
making rapid progress and decreased the frequency of physiotherapy. The 
physiotherapists knew that Michael had problems swallowing and lost weight 
but reinterpreted the situation as ‘slow neural recovery’. This had important 
consequences because it reduced what is regarded as an important 
component of stroke treatment (design issue).  
A case conference scheduled two months after admission occurred two 
weeks late. The various specialists (speech therapist, physiotherapist, care 
manager, nurse, the doctor did not attend) presented their findings from tests 
and assessments. The reports suggested Michael had made little recovery and 
it was suggested Michael would need nursing care and should be eligible for 
financial support. (In this jurisdiction, under some circumstances, severely 
disabled people are entitled to financial support for nursing home fees.). 
Relatives were advised they would be notified about Michael’s eligibility for 
financial support for a nursing home on a specific date within two weeks.  
Financial considerations are an important issue. Public financial support pays 
for most of the costs of residential nursing care. Otherwise the relatives have to 
pay up to £1000/ week for the care. This contrasts with the public cost of 
£1000/ day for hospital care. The researchers noted some stroke victims 
remained in hospital for extended periods over and beyond that needed for 
hospital treatment because of lack of funding for the patient to move into 
residential nursing care. This is in spite of the 700% additional public costs to 
retain them in hospital (design issue).  
Michael’s relatives were advised to urgently look for a vacancy in a nursing 
home. They were advised that high quality Nursing home places are difficult 
to find and usually filled from a waiting list. The relatives found a nursing home 
place and agreed for Michael to move there. The nursing home agreed to 
hold the place until the date of the decision about financial support. The 
financial decision, however, was delayed because Michael’s case had not 
been presented. It transpired that the relevant paperwork had not been 
signed by key staff (design issue). The nursing home agreed to hold the place 
for a further week. The arrangement to make the financial ruling failed on a 
further two occasions, with different hospital staff providing different 
explanations and excuses (often contradictory) (design issue). This resulted in 
very high levels of stress on Michael’s relatives (and Michael)..  
The nursing home was not able to retain an empty bed and Michael’s 
relatives were placed under considerable pressure by hospital management 
to agree to Michael being discharged from hospital before resolution of the 
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financial issues.. There were multiple problems with the inter-professional 
communication and integrity of this process (multiple design issues). On one 
occasion the relatives were assured by the care manager that financial 
support had been agreed, only a few minutes after nursing staff said his 
financial case had not been considered by the panel, only to be told a few 
hours later the care manager had made a mistake (design issue). After the 
third delay, Michael’s relatives were assured it would not prejudice the 
outcome of the financial decision if Michael moved into the nursing home 
and, under pressure from both the hospital and nursing home, the relatives 
agreed to Michael’s discharge into the nursing home. A few days after 
Michael’s discharge from hospital the relatives were informed Michael’s case 
for financial support had been rejected.  
This placed Michael in an impossible position in terms of getting necessary 
nursing care. At this point, Michael needed high dependency care, could not 
communicate, and had a thrombosis in one leg. The extent of Michael’s 
abilities was to move one arm and apparently to understand conversation (he 
could nod and shake his head). It was unclear how he would manage without 
nursing support. On appeal, after considerable effort by the relatives, the 
financial ruling was overturned and nursing care was funded.  
Michael’s limited physical condition meant he needed sitting support. In 
hospital this was provided by a specialist chair designed with adjustable 
support arrangements to hold stroke patients' bodies upright (an important 
part of recovery). These chairs are normally provided by the health services. 
Michael’s relatives asked about how they would obtain a suitable specialised 
wheelchair and armchair for Michael. This triggered a wheelchair assessment 
process during which it transpired that Michael also needed a custom made 
wheelchair to be provided by the hospital but would take between two and 
six months to be made available (design issue). It arrived eight weeks after 
Michael’s discharge. However, it nearly didn’t arrive at all because the 
wheelchair service had no record where Michael had been sent on discharge 
and only discovered as a result of relatives contacting them (design issue).  
Michael also needed a special armchair (paid for by his relatives) that took 
nearly three weeks to arrive. Assessment occurred only in response to relatives’ 
requests, and occurred too late for Michael to have the correct equipment 
on discharge. No process was put in place to inform relatives of the likely 
timescale or to ensure that assessment was completed to allow time for fitting, 
manufacture and delivery (design issue). It is not clear whether any 
assessment would have taken place at all if the relatives had not been 
persistent. In the end, Michael was discharged without either a wheelchair or 
his custom armchair as a result of failures of communication, faulty system 
processes and unplanned and unmanaged delays in the stroke unit systems 
(design issue). That the process worked at all was due to persistent proactive 
efforts by Michael’s relatives.  
During the time of observation, it was clear that most staff were working 
beyond what could reasonably be expected. Many were working beyond 
their hours in an attempt to rectify problems that were caused by the failing of 
hospital systems.  
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Design issue themes 
Of the design issues identified in the case study, some are abstract, some 
concrete, some organisational, some structural, and some to do with the 
design of individuals’ behaviours. They can be clustered under the following 
themes: 
• Communication processes 
• Differences in Professional assumptions and practices 
• Poor system integration (this may actually be a system of systems 
problem rather than a single system problem. However, diagnosis and 
designed solutions are similar in both cases) 
• Local suboptimisation. This occurs when a functional group, which may 
be an individual, optimises its tasks for the benefit of itself at the 
expense of the overall system. 
• Confused management processes. This design problem appeared 
common and often occurred when either a single individual has 
multiple managers who each have a claim on their time, or where 
multiple functional units or staff (e.g. nursing, food supply, 
physiotherapy, neurology, community care coordinator) are all 
necessary to a satisfactory completion of a task and yet this depends 
on individual decisions by their managers, whose focus is in optimising 
the functioning of their own cost centred area.  
• Non-medical client services. 
• Significant tensions between crisis medical care and ongoing medical 
systems 
• Weak integration of community care and transition to community care 
with medical services and hospital care services. 
• Poor transitional arrangements. This design issue was observed to occur 
across all dimensions and systems. It occurred at the boundary 
between the community and hospital systems; at the transition 
between acute care and the medical ward; at the transition between 
the medical ward and the short term-acute stroke care; and at the 
transition form acute stroke care to rehabilitation ward. It also 
occurred in multiple dimensions of the transitions between in-ward 
nursing care and in- ward physiotherapy services and at the transition 
between in-hospital care and community care, in Michael’s case, his 
transition to a Nursing home. 
• Weak integration between hospital strategic planning and lower level 
processes both at the level of individual patient care services and, 
above that, in the provision of professional specialist services, and the 
management of both sorts of services. 
• Care co-ordination and professional staff. During the case study we 
observed professional behaviours that compromised the bigger 
picture of hospital services as a temporary health support for 
individuals to be able to return to normal lives in their community. 
These problem behaviours primarily appeared to be related to 
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underlying systems problems and in some cases appeared officially 
sanctioned to address systems failures. In one instance, a nurse who 
had been recently demoted because of lack of competence in 
distributing medicines was performing many duties normally assigned 
to trained staff. The reasons that she had been demoted were 
overlooked for local suboptimisation in terms of reducing costs or 
addressing staffing mismanagement. 
• Staff, especially trained nursing staff, were often unable to complete 
their work in the time available. Some stayed on at the end of their shift 
to try to catch up, even though they did not get paid overtime. Other 
staff complained about the pressure they felt under and stated that 
this erode their sense of job satisfaction. For some staff alcohol abuse 
seemed to be an issue. According to Cary Cooper, this is often 
symptomatic of unsustainable staff stress (Cooper, 1998). 
• Ongoing multidimensional tension between hospital management 
processes and the management of specialist professional liability and 
risk 
• Ongoing overwork of staff in the main to rectify problems intrinsically 
caused by problematic designs of hospital systems. Classically, this 
latter is a management issue rather than a failing of workers (Deming, 
1986). 
Discussion 
Many of the above design issues are closely related to weakness in the 
integrity of decision-making processes whereby many decisions have multiple 
dimensions in integrated situations and are delegated to specialists who are 
have a limited focus that does not include the other dimensions of integrated 
service provision. This is a core design issue and applies whether a hospital 
applies models of integrated care or multidisciplinary care.  
Currently, the hospital system primarily comprises two contradictory systems: 
• Specialists with highly focused specialist knowledge and bounded 
knowledge and responsibilities (this is to avoid specialists acting outside 
their expertise in ways that might lead the health service to be subject 
to litigation and legal charge of incompetence) 
• A health provision situation that requires complex integrated 
multidimensional services responses across a variety of specialist 
functions.  
Attempts to resolve this systemic contradiction follow two paths: 1) 
multidisciplinary case meetings; and 2) specialist integration managers whose 
responsibility is to manage the integrated care of a patient. Our observation is 
that both approaches fail to the extent that the overall system fails. It was 
inferred from observation that a primary reason these approaches failed to 
provide integration is because of the embedded culture of reification of 
specialists. This is particularly evident in the system tensions between acute, 
crisis medical care and longer term care. It occurs in different forms. In acute 
crisis care, integrated responses appear to be subsumed to ‘addressing the 
crisis of the moment’. In longer term medical care, the failure occurs because 
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the attention is to maximise the efficacies and reduce Coasian transaction 
costs of day to day care processes in which integration systems are regarded 
as an add-on to be deferred or ignored. The weight of time, effort and 
attention is on the habituated delivery of routine services of feeding, 
medication  delivery, toileting, and managing visitors.  
Systems Design – Viable Systems and Ashby 
In design terms, many of the above design problem themes can be usefully 
interpreted via Beer’s Viable Systems Model and Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety as extended by the authors. 
In system terms, most of the above design problem themes can be located on 
Beer’s Viable System Model (Beer, 1972, 1988) as shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1 Viable System Model (Green, 2007) 
Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) shows the essential elements and 
relationships needed by any system to be viable and function successfully. A 
viable system comprises five main subsystems.  
Systems 1 are sub-systems that interact directly with the external environment 
(represented by the ‘clouds’) to undertake the main purposes of the overall 
system. Typically, there are several. In the hospital systems these Systems 1 
include all the subunits that support patient medical treatment and care such 
as specialist doctors, surgery, physiotherapy, feeding, ward cleaning services, 
patient records administration, patient transport systems etc Each System 1 is 
also a complete system – the VSM is recursive.  
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System 2 comprises the processes by which Systems 1 interact and are 
monitored and coordinated by System 3.  
System 3 is an intermediate management sub-system between Systems 1 and 
Systems 4 and 5. It comprises all that is necessary to direct Systems 1 (rules, 
rights and responsibilities) and to monitor and manage Systems 1. In the 
hospital system, System 3 is undertaken by managers at the level of ward sister. 
System 3 also includes an algedonic loop to manage rapid change of crisis 
and failure. Note: this is crisis and failure of the system – not the patient.  
The focus of System 4 is gathering information from the external environment. 
In the hospital system, this is information such as the needs of the 
constituencies that the hospital supports, new medical technologies and 
improved ways of designing hospital systems. System 4 provides evaluation 
and forecasting information to management systems 3 and 5.  
System 5 provides overall policy and strategic guidance for the whole 
organisation. This is typically the role taken by the hospital board and senior 
administrators. For a more detailed description see, for example, Beer (1989; 
1995) and Hutchinson (1997). 
Where an organisation is designed such that any of the VSM functions are 
missing or weak then a range of typical organisational pathological 
developments occur. Several of these characteristic pathologies can be seen 
in the list of design problem issues and themes that emerged in the case study. 
In this case study, three particularly obvious system problems that relate to the 
above design issues are: 
1. Multiple Systems 3 which are themselves uncoordinated and have 
weak line management and information flow relations with Systems 2, 
4 and 5. The consequence are failures of management confusion, 
faulty integration of services, and flawed transitional arrangements 
that typify most of the design issues identified earlier. 
2. Reification of some Systems 1 (doctors and specialist medical 
personnel) such that they are tacitly and sometimes explicitly locally 
given the status and line management of Systems 3, 4 and 5. This 
results in complete failure of integrated management of the system. 
3. Attempts to superficially remedy the problems of failure of System 3 by 
overemphasis of System 2. That is, to requires some Systems 1 to be 
subjected to high levels of self reporting to management. This fails on a 
number of counts, the most obvious being that System 3 is weak and 
unable to fulfill its role. An additional effect is that it results in System 3 
responsibilities being pushed down to individual Systems 1. Again this 
destroys the primary functioning of the System 3 role of providing 
integrated management of Systems 1. 
Applying Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety echoes this picture. In a hospital 
system that is operating in an organisationally healthy manner, the primary 
generator of variety is the patient. System variety is primarily generated via 
their illness and related issues (e.g. missing work, managing children etc). The 
hospital acts as a system of controlling variety in which the variety due to the 
patient’s illness is attenuated in an appropriate manner such that the patient 
can leave hospital and as much as possible resume their life. 
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The case study reported a situation in which the largest generators of system 
variety are the hospital systems themselves. Much of this extraneous system 
variety is in the form of defects caused by failures of integrated response in 
the control variety generating systems causing problems that must then be 
addressed. Examples of this in the above case are the failure of integration of 
patient feeding processes, the failure of case meetings and the failure of the 
community care and in-community care funding decision making processes. 
These defect and failures of system design resulted in additional work to 
respond to the patient’s relatives, providing additional hospital services to the 
patient because of the earlier failures compromised the patient’s recovery; 
and redoing of administrative and decision making processes with additional 
layers of paperwork. In systems terms, many of these issues are caused by 
mismatch in the distribution of the generators of system variety and control 
variety driven by local subsystems’ attempts to manipulate the system to gain 
additional power, status and resources (Glanville, 1994; T Love & T Cooper, 
2007; T. Love & T. Cooper, 2007). 
These issues are also addressed by Deming’s (1986) classic work on quality 
management where he describes the central importance of designing 
systems so as to primarily reduce defect generation. In the case of the hospital 
system observed in this case study; defect generation is high and mainly 
comprises failed provision of integrated services or failures in transition of the 
patient and patient control between sub-systems. In essence, these failures 
are primarily generated by the hospital systems themselves and align with the 
diagnosis from Beer’s Viable System Model and the variety analyses.  
The analyses above contradict and explain the implications of findings of 
Sulch and colleagues (2000) who found no differences in outcomes between 
integrated care and conventional multidisciplinary care models of stroke 
treatment and suggested the advantage lay with the conventional 
multidisciplinary care is resources did not need to be allocated to the person 
undertaking the integration. The findings of this research suggest that the 
significant potential benefits attached to the use of the integrated services 
model over multidisciplinary care will only be available with resolution of the 
systems problems identified above  
The observations of this research suggest that the outcomes of both 
integrated care and conventional multidisciplinary care are deeply 
compromised by systemic organisational problems. The ‘deep slice’ systems 
analysis used in this case study suggests that all hospital processes are likely to 
be significantly compromised where they  involve supplying multiple services 
to a patient due to the systems exhibiting the pathologies of a compromised 
viable system as per Beer’s VSM.  These systemic pathologies would be 
expected to cut away the potential advantages of the integrated stroke 
services model and reduce outcomes to similar to conventional 
multidisciplinary approach as found by Sulch (2000). The implied opportunity 
to improve stroke unit outcomes is to resolve the serious systemic issues first 
and then move to an integrated stroke service model.  
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Conclusion – three design heuristics to improve design of 
systems for hospital stroke units 
The above case study has identified and analysed design issues in a hospital 
stroke unit in terms of systems design using three approaches. The analyses 
indicate significant opportunity for improved design of the hospital’s systems. 
Some design issues appear foundational: addressing systems integration; 
dealing with transitions; and addressing the contradictions between specialist 
professional services and management of integrated service delivery. When 
the systems are mapped to the VSM, the observed problems align directly 
with the predictions of organisational pathologies.  
The three analysis approaches suggests three design heuristics in creating 
improved design solutions for the stroke unit. These would also be expected to 
apply more widely across other hospital systems and hospitals: 
1. Review existing hospital systems in terms of the Viable Systems 
Model to identify structural problems in systemic design, and design 
new systems to address these structural problems  
2. Focus design resources on supporting management to address 
provide significantly improved support for fully integrated care 
provision. This means developing designs that will in parallel support 
specialist professionals in avoiding liability whilst acting against the 
current culture of inappropriate reification of specialist professionals. 
3. A focus on integrated care at organisaitonal transition points. This 
requires all dimensions of patient care, community issues care and 
medical care to be managed in an integrated manner when the 
patient is transferred into and out of the hospital and within the 
hospital from one subsystem area to another.  
The case study suggests that targeting these three areas of design will place 
the focus on the lever points of addressing the primary areas of systems failure. 
In addition, it would be expected that addressing these issues will also 
incidentally address most secondary systems issues and open up the potential 
for gaining the benefits of integrated care over multidisciplinary care. 
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